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Abstract
This paper estimates the dynamic aggregate effect of exogenous shocks to two key 
components of public expenditure in the United States: government income transfers 
and government spending. The identifi cation strategy positions the structural shocks to 
public expenditures in an SVAR framework with exogenous measures of public expenditure 
changes. Transfers shocks are based on a new narrative variable of legislated increases 
in U.S. social security benefi ts. I demonstrate that shocks to different types of public 
expenditure do not have the same macroeconomic impact. The estimated government 
spending multiplier is between 0 and 1, while increases in transfers generate a multiplier 
effect above 1.
Keywords: government expenditures, transfer payments, social security.
JEL classifi cation: E2, E62, H55, H56, I38.
Resumen
Este trabajo estima el efecto agregado dinámico de shocks exógenos a dos componentes clave 
del gasto público en  Estados Unidos, las transferencias de renta y el gasto gubernamental 
en bienes y servicios. La estrategia de identifi cación instrumenta los shocks estructurales al 
gasto público en un marco SVAR con medidas exógenas de cambios en el gasto público. 
Los shocks de las transferencias se basan en una nueva variable narrativa de aumentos 
legislados en la seguridad social de Estados Unidos. Demuestro que shocks a diferentes tipos 
de gasto público no tienen el mismo impacto macroeconómico. El multiplicador estimado del 
gasto gubernamental en bienes y servicios está entre 0 y 1, mientras que incrementos en las 
transferencias generan un efecto multiplicador por encima de 1.
Palabras clave: gasto público, transferencias de renta, seguridad social. 
Códigos JEL: E2, E62, H55, H56, I38.
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1 Introduction
Government spending and government income transfers represent the two key com-
ponents of public expenditures in the United States. Figure 1 shows that these cat-
egories account jointly for about 80% of total public expenditures. Within public
expenditures, government income transfers have become the most important cate-
gory over time. However, the existing literature on the aggregate effects of public
expenditures shocks has focused on government spending shocks (recent examples
include Perotti 2007, Mountford and Uhlig 2009, Ramey 2011, Fisher and Petters
2010, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011, Nakamura and Steinsson 2014, Wilson
2012, and Sua´rez-Serrato and Wingender 2014, Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Lis-
cow, and Woolton 2012). This paper instead estimates the dynamic aggregate effect
of exogenous shocks to different public expenditures in the United States over the
post-WWII sample. Specifically, I estimate the response of aggregate expenditure
components and labor market indicators to increases in government spending and
government income transfers.
Evidence on the aggregate effects of government income transfers shocks is
scarce and has focused on the effect that changes in income have on private con-
sumption expenditures. In the framework of the permanent income hypothesis,
Poterba (1988) estimates that a $1 increase in transitory income due to the U.S.
tax rebates of 1975 raised spending of non-durables and services by about 12 to 24
cents. Wilcox (1989) finds that a predictable 10% increase in U.S. social security
benefits raises durable goods purchases by 3% in the same month. More recently,
Romer and Romer (2016) construct a series of legislated increases in social security
benefits in the U.S. from 1951 to 1991 and study the effect of innovations to their
narrative variable on private consumption. This paper extends Romer and Romer
(2016) along two dimensions. First, I estimate and compare the aggregate effect
of exogenous shocks to different public expenditures. Secondly, I expand the set
of outcome variables to include output, investment, consumption of durables, non-
durables and services, imports, and several labor market indicators. Moreover, this
paper complements parallel work in Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez (2016). There I estimate
the aggregate effect of government income transfers shocks but for a sample of EU
countries over 2007-2015.
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Figure 1: U.S. Federal Government Main Expenditures as Percentage of Total Pub-
lic Expenditures from 1947:I-2015:II.
lated to the state of the U.S. economy. On the other hand, finding a good instrument
for structural shocks to transfers is no trivial task. The strong link between inflation
and the narrative variable by Romer and Romer (2016) motivates estimating a new
I adopt the identification strategy of Mertens and Ravn (2013) and identify the
structural shocks to public expenditures in an SVAR framework with exogenous
measures of public expenditure changes. The ‘Proxy SVAR’ is an attractive es-
timator because it does not impose direct short-run assumptions, as in the SVAR
approach of, for example, Perotti (2007). Moreover, the instruments do not need
a one-to-one mapping with the structural shocks, as in the narrative approach of
Ramey (2011) or Romer and Romer (2016). Structural shocks to government
spending are instrumented with a measure of U.S. defense spending shocks by
Ramey (2011), and available from 1969:I. Military spending has been widely ac-
cepted in the profession as a good source of exogenous variation for government
spending in the U.S. because it is induced by geopolitical events most likely unre-
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measure of exogenous shocks to government income transfers. The new measure
is based on the residuals of regressing an extension of the narrative series on infla-
tion. Unlike the original narrative series, the new measure cannot be predicted by
aggregate variables representing the state of the economy.
The principal contribution of this paper is an estimate of the fiscal multiplier
for different components of public expenditures, especially for government income
transfers. The estimated impact multiplier for both types of public expenditure is
close to 0.2. However, differences build up over time. Four quarters later, transfers
have an accumulated multiplier effect equal to one, while it is only 0.7 for gov-
ernment spending. Moreover, an estimated positive response of output to transfers
shocks yields a gradually rising cumulative multiplier, with a maximum effect of
2.8 by the end of the forecast horizon. In contrast, the government spending mul-
tiplier reaches its maximum cumulative effect at one between the sixth and twelve
quarter. Thereafter, I find that a government spending shock induces a fall bellow
trend of output, which translates into an accumulated multiplier effect below unity.
The different estimates could be explained by the different transmission mecha-
nism that government spending and income transfers have. On one hand, govern-
ment spending contributes directly to aggregate demand producing and providing
services to the public. The estimates though indicate that increases in government
spending do not sufficiently enhance private spending to generate a multiplier ef-
fect larger than one. On the other hand, government income transfers affect indi-
rectly aggregate demand through changing individuals’ disposable income and their
spending decisions. The estimates are consistent with household level evidence that
benefits recipients are likely to have higher marginal propensities to consume than
other individuals (for example, Hausman 2016, Bodkin 1959, Johnson, Parker and
Soulesles 2006, Johnson, McClelland, Parker, and Souleles 2013). I find a positive
response of private spending to increases in transfers, especially consumption of
durable goods. I also find a positive response of nonresidential investment. More-
over, the estimated transfers multiplier reaches values larger than one despite a neu-
tralizing response of monetary policy, and a negative response of labor supply by
labor market participants due to the self-financed nature of increases in transfers.
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The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the econo-
metric framework and gives details about the narrative variables. Section 3 presents
evidence on the effect of shocks to different components of public expenditures;
section 3.3 presents an analysis in terms of multipliers. Section 4 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Econometric framework
2.1 Baseline specification
The aim of this paper is to estimate the dynamic aggregate effect of exogenous
shocks to different components of public expenditures. The system of simulta-
neous equations describing the dynamics between public expenditures and other
macroeconomic variables of interest can be expressed by:
A0Yt = c0+ c1t+
p
∑
j=1
A jYt− j + ε t (1)
The matrix A0 describes the contemporaneous correlation across the n endogenous
variables contained in Yt . The deterministic term ct = c0+c1t includes a linear time
trend. A j, j = 1, ..., p, are the n×n coefficients matrices. The orthogonal structural
shocks ε t are assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and normalized covariance ma-
trix, i.e. E[ε t ] = 0, E[ε tε ′t ] = I, E[ε tε ′s] = 0 for s = t and I is the identity matrix.
Premultiplying the system by B ≡ A−10 we have the reduced form representation to
be estimated:
Yt = μ0+μ1t+
p
∑
j=1
Φ jYt− j +ut (2)
where μ = Bc, Φ j = BA j, for j = 1, ..., p, and the n× 1 vector of reduced form
residuals ut = Bε t .
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Identifying restrictions are required to compute economically meaningful im-
pulse responses. The existing literature offers several alternatives. The SVAR ap-
proach pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) uses institutional knowledge to
directly impose the value of some elements in B. Alternatively, Mountford and Uh-
lig (2009) impose sign restrictions. The appeal of the SVAR approach resides in its
simplicity, however, Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Ramey (2011) document two im-
portant shortcomings: fiscal foresight and uncertainty regarding the imposed fixed
parameters. The narrative approach as of Romer and Romer (2010) uses the narra-
tive record to construct a measure of the structural shock of interest and estimates
the aggregate response to changes in such measure. I instead adopt the identification
strategy of Mertens and Ravn (2013) and instrument the structural shock to either
public expenditure in the SVAR with an exogenous measure of changes in the pub-
lic expenditure. The Proxy SVAR is an attractive estimator because it avoids direct
assumptions on the elements of B, as in the traditional SVAR approach. Moreover,
and unlike the narrative approach, the Proxy SVAR does not assume that the prox-
ies have a one-to-one mapping with the true structural shocks. It does not require
that each proxy is correlated with only a single structural shock either. Put it differ-
ently, the proxy SVAR does a superior control of measurement error regarding the
narratively identified shocks compared to the narrative approach.
The identifying strategy complements the n(n+ 1)/2 independent restrictions
from estimating the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals with (n− k)k
additional identifying restrictions from k proxies for the structural shocks of inter-
est. While insufficient to identify all coefficients in B, the additional restrictions
allow to identify sufficient coefficients to estimate impulse responses to the struc-
tural shocks of interest, in this case, shocks to public expenditures. Let mt be the
k× 1 vector of proxy variables and partition the structural shocks ε t = [ε ′1t ,ε ′2t ]′
such that ε1t contains the k shocks to public expenditures. The key requirement for
identification is that the proxy variables need to be correlated with the structural
shocks of interest but uncorrelated with all other shocks. That is,
E[mtε ′1t ] = Ω (3)
E[mtε ′2t ] = 0 (4)
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Notice that the inability to recover all the coefficients in B comes from not placing
further assumptions on Ω except from invertibility.
I estimate separately the aggregate effect of shocks to government spending and
transfers. The baseline VAR for transfers includes social security benefits to per-
sons, output, and as controls for tax and monetary policy the Barro-Redlick average
marginal income tax rate, the federal funds rate and the Consumer Price Index for
urban wage earners and clerical workers.1
Government income transfers include very different types of benefits. For ex-
ample, transfers in cash like old age pensions differ substantially from medical
benefits. Another example is that recipients of unemployment benefits are engaged
in labor market activities, while recipients of old age pensions and disability in-
surance are out of the labor force. I focus on social security benefits to facilitate
the economic interpretation of the results. Social security benefits also have the
largest share among government income transfers (see Figure A1 in the appendix).
Moreover, the broader the definition of transfers, the less relevant the instrument
becomes. The structural shocks to transfers are based on an extension of the Romer
and Romer (2016) narrative of U.S. social security benefits increases. The sample
consists of quarterly observations from 1951:I-2007:IV.
To study the aggregate effect of government spending shocks, the baseline VAR
replaces social security benefits with government consumption expenditures and
gross investment. The structural shocks to government spending are instrumented
with a measure of U.S. defense spending shocks by Ramey (2011), available from
1969:I-2007:IV.
1I use the CPI for urban wage earners because this is the index of reference for the cost-of-
living-adjustments of social security benefits in the U.S. In the appendix I explore alternative price
indexes.
Given the limited number of observations, I follow Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2004), and Ramey (2011) strategy to estimate the effect of an expenditure
shock on other variables of interest, adding them, one at a time, to the baseline
VARs. This estimation strategy balances the number of parameters to be estimated
and the inclusion of enough variables to avoid significant omitted variable bias. The
additional variables include the other public expenditure, consumer expenditures in
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non-durable goods and services, durable-goods purchases, imports, residential and
non-residential private investment, total hours per worker, employment per capita,
labor force per capita, a measure of the real wage and productivity. Precise data
definitions can be found in the Data Appendix. According to Akaike’s information
criterion, the lag length is set to four in all specifications.
2.2 Narrative measures
This section elaborates on the measures used as instruments for the structural shocks
to public expenditures in the SVARs.
2.2.1 Government income transfers shocks
The proxy for the structural shocks to government income transfers is based on the
series by Romer and Romer (2016). Using documents from the Social Security
Bulletin, reports from the U.S. Congress, the Economic Report of the President and
presidential speeches they identify the motivation, timing, and size of legislated
changes in social security benefits in the United States from 1951:I to 1991:IV.2
The narrative series includes benefit increases in the old-age and survivors insur-
ance program (OASI), the disability insurance program (DI), and the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program. In turn, Romer and Romer (2016) classify benefit
increases into whether they were permanent or temporary. Given that consumption
theory like the life-cycle permanent income model predicts very different impact
2Romer and Romer (2016) construct a monthly series. I sum the monthly values within a quarter
to create the quarterly series.
from permanent and temporary income changes, Romer and Romer (2016) compare
their effects. The goal of this paper though is to compare the dynamic aggregate
effect of different components of public expenditures and from now on focuses on
permanent income changes.3 To account for anticipation effects, I follow Mertens
3Romer and Romer (2016) find that temporary benefit increases have a much smaller impact on
consumption than permanent increases. They argue that one explanation could be the size of perma-
nent and temporary benefit increases. Being the later much larger their findings are consistent with
previous evidence that consumers would behave as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis
(rule-of-thumb consumers) for relatively large (small) income changes.
4
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and Ravn (2012) and exclude all social security benefits changes with more than 90
days between their enactment and the actual increase.4 Moreover, consistent with
Romer and Romer (2016) methodology I extend this narrative series until 2007:IV
with all benefits increases due to automatic cost-of-living adjustments. Table A2
in the appendix contains more details about these additional observations. The
extended series overlaps more quarters with the series for government spending
shocks and facilitates comparing the estimates.
Romer and Romer (2016) classify as exogenous the changes in Social Security
benefits to keep up with past inflation, or to increase the insurance provided by the
Social Security programs, i.e. ideological motivation of fairness or equity. How-
ever, a major concern regrading the Romer and Romer (2016) series is the link
between inflation and increases in benefits. To the extent that inflation responds to
the state of the economy, there exists concern that macroeconomic developments
might be leading the increases in benefits motivated by a desire to keep up with past
inflation. For example, a Granger causality test of the extended narrative series on
inflation has a p-value of 0.00, thus rejecting the null that inflation does not Granger
cause the narrative series.5 Romer and Romer (2016) argue that there is no reason
to expect increases in benefits to keep up with past inflation to be systematically
correlated with contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions. Until adopting auto-
4From a total of 58 observations, 14 changes in social security benefits were legislated at least
90 days before their implementation. I verified how important these observations are for the results
and the estimates are similar whether they are included.
5The inflation rate is based on the CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers. Alternative
tests on real output per capita, and the unemployment rate result in an p-value of 0.71 and 0.24
respectively. P-values for tests using the original series are 0.01, 0.14 and 0.34 respectively. All
regressions include 12 lags of the narrative variable and the aggregate.
matic indexation in 1974, increases in benefits to mitigate the loss of purchasing
power due to past inflation were ad hoc and irregularly spaced. Thereafter, auto-
matic indexation at discrete intervals weakens the relationship between increases in
benefits and short-run macroeconomic developments. In other words, automatic in-
dexation is not deliberately countercyclical because the cost-of-living adjustments
are limited by law to take place once a year. Indexation is automatic as opposed
to previous irregular increases in benefits. Moreover, Romer and Romer (2016)
exclude all changes explicitly undertaken with a countercyclical motivation.
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I take additional steps to address the potential endogeneity issues. First, I re-
move the predictable response to inflation from the increases in benefits. The new
measure of exogenous shocks to transfers are the residuals of regressing the non-
zero observations of the narrative series on a constant and the lag of inflation. To
be consistent with the calculation of cost-of-living adjustments, the inter-annual
change in CPI for urban wage earners is used as the measure for inflation. The
new series cannot be predicted by inflation or other aggregates such as real output
per capita or the unemployment rate. Moreover, I include controls for monetary
and tax policy in the baseline VARs, that is, the Federal Funds rate, the price level,
and the Barro-Redlick average marginal income tax rate. Notice that including the
price level accounts for other influences not removed from the new measure of ex-
ogenous shocks, and that might affect both benefits increases and inflation. Finally,
because of the self-financed nature of Social Security benefits, including the aver-
age marginal income tax rate also accounts for the potential bias from a coupling of
increases in benefits and higher taxes.6
A good instrument also needs to have explanatory power over the VAR residuals.
I adopt Ramey (2011)’s strategy to test the relevance of the candidate proxy vari-
6Social Security in the United States are federal programs financed with payroll taxes, also
known as Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. The Social Security trust funds provide
an accounting mechanism for tracking all income to and disbursements from the trust funds. The
Social Security Act limits trust fund expenditures to benefits and administrative costs. Between 1985
and 2010 the Social Security trust funds had persistent surpluses. In 1982 the assets of the largest
trust fund (OASI) were nearly depleted. The deficit was addressed with a temporary borrowing
from other federal trust funds and enacted legislation to strengthen OASI Trust Fund financing. The
borrowed amounts were repaid with interest within 4 years. See www.ssa.gov.
ables as an instrument for the structural shocks to public expenditures. Compared
to the standard narrative literature, the proxy SVAR instruments the latent shocks
to public expenditures instead of the aggregate series of public expenditures. The
tests are based on a regression of the reduced form residuals from the baseline VAR
on the proxies. The new measure of exogenous shocks to social security benefits
has an F-statistic equal to 16.5 (second row Table 1). Moreover, the results for the
relevance tests offer additional validation to extending the narrative series. Extend-
ing the narrative series improves the proxy’s explanatory power compared to the
original series (first row Table 1).
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Table 1: Relevance Tests for the Candidate Proxy Variables
F-test p-value
Original sample 9.05 0.003
Extended sample 16.48 0.000
Notes: A shorthand for the proxies on the left. Original sample from
1951:I-1991:IV. Extended sample from 1951:I-2007:IV.
Figure 2 compares the extended narrative variable (gray line) with the new mea-
sure of transfers shocks based on the non-predictable residuals (black line). The fig-
ure plots the demeaned narrative shocks and expressed as percentage of last quarter
total taxable personal income. The first observation in 1952 correspond to an in-
crease in social security benefits to keep up with the inflation that had occurred
during the Korean War. The next two observations in the 1950s also correspond
to discretionary increases in benefits to keep up with inflation. The observations
in the 1960s reflect extensions of benefits to improve the insurance component of
the Social Security programs. In 1971 we find again another discretionary increase
in benefits to keep up with inflation. Since 1975, the observations correspond to
automatic cost-of-living adjustments. Until 1983 the indexation of social security
benefits was effective in June, thereafter the increases are effective in December.
Compared to the narrative series, the non-predictable residuals correct downwards
the cost-of-living adjustments and give more importance to the early observations.
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Figure 2: Proxy Variables for Social Security Benefits Shocks, U.S. 1951:I-2007:IV
2.2.2 Government spending shocks
Ramey (2011) estimates two variables that serve as potential instruments for gov-
ernment spending structural shocks. First, using Business Week and other news-
paper sources, Ramey (2011) constructs a variable for military spending news as
a measure of government spending shocks from 1890 to 2013. Alternatively, the
second variable is based on the survey of professional forecasters predictions about
U.S. defense spending. This second variable covers the period 1969-2008. The nar-
rative measures are based on spending forecasts, which approximate the changes in
expectations at the time and account for anticipation effects.
Ramey’s variables rely on the identifying assumption that U.S. national military
spending is dominated by foreign political events, and as such, most likely to be
unrelated with the state of the U.S. economy. Recently, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014) exploit the regional differences in military procurement across U.S. states
to estimate the government spending multiplier. Their observations contribute as
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Table 2: Predictability Tests for Candidate Proxy Variables
Output Inflation Unemp. rate
Based on SPF 0.72 0.89 0.24
Based on newspapers 0.88 0.96 0.51
Notes: p-values for Granger causality tests. A shorthand for the aggregate variable is
stated at the top. A shorthand for the narrative variables is stated on the left. Regressions
include twelve lags of the narrative variable and the selected aggregates. Sample for the
narrative variable based on SPF 1969I:2007:IV. Sample for the narrative variable based
on newspapers 1951I:2007IV.
for a longer sample from 1951:I-2007:IV. Despite the interest in using the longer
sample, the tests clearly select the news variable based on professional forecasts.
Table 3 reports the relevance tests of defense news shocks as proxy for structural
shocks to government spending. Again, the F-test and associated p-value are from
regressions of the reduced form residuals from the baseline VAR on each candi-
date. The VAR including the news variable based on the professional forecasters
survey is from 1969:I-2007:IV. The news variable based on newspapers is available
evidence that U.S. foreign military interventions are unlikely to be related to the
state of the U.S. national economy. On the other hand, Albornoz and Hauk (2014)
find that the party of the government, and the presidential approval rate are key
factors determining the willingness of the U.S. to foreign military interventions. As
for the candidate proxies for transfers shocks, we can test the predictability of the
narrative variables related to government spending. The tests illustrate that either of
Ramey (2011)’s narrative variables cannot be predicted by aggregates representing
the estate of the economy (Table 2).
Table 3: Relevance Tests Candidate Proxy Variables
F-test p-value
Based on SPF 176.33 0.00
Based on newspapers 4.84 0.03
Notes: A shorthand for the narrative variable is stated on the left. Sam-
ple for the narrative variable based on SPF 1969I:2007:IV. Sample for the
narrative variable based on newspapers 1951I:2007IV.
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As reported by Ramey (2011), the exclusion of the WWII from the sample period
affects considerably the explanatory power of the instrument based on newspaper
sources (see her table III on pg. 28).7 The proxy variable is the demeaned narrative
variable and expressed as percentage of last quarter gross domestic product.
3 The aggregate effect of public expenditures shocks
Discriminating between government spending and income transfers provides a richer
analysis of the aggregate effect of public expenditure shocks. Section 3.1 presents
the estimates for government income transfers shocks. Section 3.2 describes the
aggregate impact of government spending shocks. All impulse responses are for
a 1 percent increase in either public expenditure, and the forecast horizon is set to
20 quarters. Solid lines report the point estimates; broken lines report bootstrap-
computed 95 percent confidence intervals. Section 3.3 compares the estimates in
terms of the multiplier effect.
3.1 The aggregate effect of government income transfers shocks
Figure 3 shows the effect of an increase in social security benefits. The initial in-
crease of 1 percent is reduced by half in four quarters, then social security benefits
gradually revert to the pre-shock level. An increase in social security benefits im-
plies a positive output response. Output rises 0.15 percent on impact and has peak
response in the second quarter of 0.2 percent. Although the output response is pos-
itive during the entire forecast horizon, it is only significant the first four quarters.
Benefits increases also trigger a positive response of aggregate expenditure com-
ponents. Consumption of nondurables and services, and durable goods purchases
7Fisher and Peters (2010) constructs an alternative narrative measure based on the accumulated
excess returns of large US military contractors. However, this instrument results in less explanatory
power for government spending (see Table 2 in their paper).
show a significant increase in the short-run. Consistent with evidence at the house-
hold level, durable goods purchases respond more than private consumption of non-
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durables and services; the impact responses are 0.57 and 0.07 percent respectively.8
The estimated consumption response is lower than estimates by Romer and Romer
(2016). They find that a permanent benefit increase of 1 percent raises aggregate
consumption by 1.2 percent in the month the checks arrive. The effect persists after
four months. However, their estimates are also mainly driven by a rise in durables
consumption. In Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez (2016) I also find that innovations to old age
pensions trigger a larger response of durables purchases than non-durables. Non-
residential investment increases significantly during the first 6 quarters, with peak
increase in the fourth quarter of 0.45 percent. One explanation for this positive re-
sponse of nonresidential investment could be that businesses, like policymakers (as
explained below), see increases in social security benefits as expansionary. More-
over, Romer and Romer (2010) also find a strong response of investment to tax cuts
which, as they argue, could be explained if investment depends strongly on overall
economic conditions.
The narrative of Romer and Romer (2016) finds that increases in social secu-
rity benefits often include increases in payroll taxes in their legislation. Consistent
with this evidence, the rise in social security benefits is tax-financed. An increase
in social security benefits is accompanied by a significant and steady increase in
the Average Marginal Income Tax Rate, which rises 0.17 percentage points upon
impact. The combined response of output and the average marginal tax income rate
imply an increase in tax revenues. This response of the AMITR is also consistent
with results obtained using total tax revenues instead.
On the other hand, the narrative analysis does not find contemporaneous in-
creases of other public expenditures. The rise in government spending questions
identifying assumption (4) and could suggest that the output response might be due
to higher government spending. However, the instruments for government spending
and income transfers shocks have a correlation close to zero, i.e. -0.04.9 Moreover,
8See, for example, Johnson et al (2013, 2006) and Souleles (1999).
9Sample available for both variables from 1969:I-2007:IV.
next section demonstrates that government spending shocks have a weaker impact
on output and aggregate expenditure components. For example, an increase in gov-
ernment spending yields a flat response of durable goods purchases. Augmenting
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Figure 3: Aggregate Effect Social Security Benefits Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses from VAR. Sample 1951:I-2007:IV. Baseline includes social security ben-
efits, output, AMITR, FF rate, price level. Inflation response computed as the annualized change in
the price level. Augmented VARs include all other variables one at a time. Solid lines report point
estimates. Broken lines report 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 3 cont’d
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the baseline VAR with government spending does not significantly change the out-
put response either. The positive government spending response to increases in
social security benefits could simply be an automatic response to higher tax rev-
enues. It could also be due to higher private consumption of services provided by
the government and charged below market price such as health-care.
Benefits increases yield a slight, but persistent rise in the real wage of the busi-
ness sector. This contributes to higher inflation in the medium term. The inflation
rate responds with delay to an increase in social security benefits. By the fourth
quarter inflation has a maximum increase of 0.12 percentage points. The response
of inflation is significant at standard levels for 8 quarters.10 More importantly, the
inflationary nature of increases in benefits triggers a response of monetary policy.
Romer and Romer (2016) document the counteracting monetary policy response
to increases in social security benefits examining the minutes of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. For example, the staff economic report for
the meeting on the 10th of August 1965, pg.28, states that
The mailing of checks to Social Security beneficiaries, including both the new
higher scale of payments and lump-sum retroactive benefits, will be adding to
disposable personal income shortly. [. . .] How rapidly, and for what goods or
services, recipients of the benefits will spend their funds is a big unknown; we
have very little basis for estimating the consumption function for this older
age group. But its hard to believe that the bulk of it wont get into the spending
stream fairly promptly.
And in pg. 65, we find
I would not want to ease policy right now, for a considerable degree of new
fiscal stimulus lies immediately ahead of us. Some of this will come from the
enlarged Social Security payments.
Regarding labor market indicators, increases in benefits trigger a positive re-
sponse of labor participation and employment from the 4th quarter. The point es-
10The response of inflation is computed as the annualized change in the price level.
timates though are imprecisely estimated and insignificant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level. On the other hand, hours do not respond in the short run but fall in
the medium and longer run. The combined effect of higher output with the same
hours during the first four quarters yields a significant increase in productivity in the
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short run. The negative response of hours in the medium and longer-term indicates
that increases in benefits distort labor supply of labor market participants. This is
consistent with the view that higher taxes represent a weaker incentive to work (for
example, Rogerson 2007; Olovsson 2009; Nickell 2004; Prescott 2004; and Ragan
2013).
To summarize, increases in social security benefits yield a positive output re-
sponse. While all consumption aggregates show a positive response, households
spend a larger fraction of the increased benefits in durable goods. Business see
increases in benefits as expansionary and invest in their production capacity. How-
ever, increases in benefits also generate inflationary pressures that induce monetary
policy to tighten. Finally, increases in benefits are self-financed and distort labor
supply of labor market participants in the medium and longer term.
Understanding the sign of the bias
The close link to inflation of the Romer and Romer (2016)’s series raised doubts
about the exogeneity of the narrative variable. Yet, if the nature of social security
benefits increases implies a positive correlation between the state of the economy
and transfers, we would expect a positive bias in the estimates using the narrative
variable. Many increases in benefits are motivated by the desire to keep up with
past inflation. Then, periods of higher inflation like expansions would translate
into larger increases in benefits, and vice versa. Estimates that use the (extended)
narrative variable as an instrument for the structural shocks to transfers would over-
estimate the effect of transfers shocks because part of the positive impact attributed
to increases in transfers would be the result of concealed factors associated with a
good estate of the economy. To better understand the potential bias, a comparison
of the estimates is shown in Figure 4. Broken lines represent the estimates instru-
menting the structural shocks to transfers with the narrative measure; to help in the
comparison I reproduce again the baseline estimates (solid lines). Thin lines are
the bootstrap-computed 95 percent confidence intervals. The paths of social secu-
rity benefits are virtually the same in either specification. However, the output re-
sponses differ. The alternative specification yields a longer-lasting output response;
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Figure 4: Estimates for the Predictable and Non-Predictable Proxy
Notes: Impulse responses from VAR. Sample 1951:I-2007:IV. Solid lines report baseline estimates.
Broken lines report estimates using the extended narrative variable as instrument. Thin lines report
95 percent confidence interval.
the positive output response is bumpier and significant for 8 quarters instead of 4
quarters.
3.2 The aggregate effect of government spending shocks
Figure 5 shows the effect of increasing government spending by 1 percent. The
Proxy SVAR methodology yields results that are consistent with the findings under
alternative identification strategies. Government spending responds very persis-
tently to its own shock as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The output response to
increases in government spending is positive in the short run and significant during
3 quarters. Thereafter output declines and falls below trend before returning to the
pre-shock level. The peak response of output corresponds to the impact increase of
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0.14 percent. If increases in government spending were less persistent, the output
response would be much similar to that of Ramey (2011).
Consumption of nondurables and services shows a hump-shaped response, with
peak increase in the fourth quarter of 0.14 percent. Unlike increases in transfers,
a rise in government spending yields a flat response of durable goods purchases.
Imports remain flat for six quarters and then decline, though its response is not
significant at standard levels. Nonresidential investment also remains flat for six
quarters and then declines, with significant maximum fall of -0.57 percent in the
14th quarter. The response of both investment components is similar to that of
Perotti (2007) (see Figure 3 in his paper).
Compared to increases in transfers, government spending increases yield a flat
response of wages in the business sector, and inflation. To the exception of an
increase of 0.13 percentage points upon impact, the inflation response is not statis-
tically significant. The estimates indicate that monetary policy does not tighten in
response to increases in government spending. The response of the Federal Funds
rate is not statistically significant. Ramey (2011) also finds a non-significant re-
sponse of the 3 moth Treasury bill rate. These estimates are in agreement with the
narrative evidence. Expanding on the examples provided in the previous section,
during the meeting on the 10th of August 1965 the shot-term effects of the step-
up in U.S. activities in Vietnam on prices were extensively discussed. The general
agreement seemed to be that “the proposed step-up in defense expenditure could
be absorbed without any significant inflationary pressures.” (Minutes, 8/10/65, p.
54). For this conclusion though, it is important to take into account that post-Korea
defense buildups involved less resources compared to the Korean outbreak (see
Ramey 2011). Moreover, consistent with other studies also excluding the Korean
war from the sample period, I find a flat response of the tax rate (see Ramey 2011,
Perotti 2007, or Fisher and Peters 2010). Social security benefits do not respond to
increases in government spending either.
Regarding labor market variables, neither employment, labor force or hours
show a statistically significant response. Similar to increases in transfers, the com-
bined effect of higher output with the same, or slightly lower, hours results in a
significant productivity rise in the short run.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Effect Government Spending Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses from VAR. Sample 1969:I-2007:IV. Baseline includes government spend-
ing, output, AMITR, FF rate, price level. Inflation response computed as the annualized change in
the price level. Augmented VARs include all other variables individually. Solid lines report point
estimates. Broken lines report 95 percent confidence interval.
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3.3 Understanding the difference between public expenditures
shocks
A principal contribution of this paper is an estimate of the output multiplier for dif-
ferent public expenditures, especially the transfers output multiplier. The analysis
so far has based on a qualitative comparison. The output multiplier is an standard-
ized measure to quantitatively compare the estimates. The output multiplier can be
calculated re-scaling the output response to either shock such that the public ex-
penditure rises by 1 percent of GDP. Figure 6 shows the multiplier effect for both
public expenditures as well as the cumulative effect for a forecast horizon of 20
quarters. The estimates indicate that both public expenditure shocks yield a simi-
lar aggregate effect on impact, with both having an impact multiplier close to 0.2.
The differences, however, build up over the forecast horizon. Four quarters later,
transfers have an accumulated effect equal to 1.0, while the government spending
cumulative multiplier is only 0.7. Furthermore, the positive response of output to
transfer shocks yields a gradually rising cumulative multiplier; after eight quarters
takes the value of 1.9, and a maximum of 2.8 by the end of the forecast horizon.
Allowing for a longer horizon is unlikely to result in a much higher effect because
the output multiplier is close to zero, and insignificant, by the end of the forecast
horizon. On the other hand, the government spending multiplier reaches its maxi-
mum accumulated effect at one between the sixth and twelve quarters. Thereafter,
the fall bellow trend of output translates into an accumulated effect of government
spending shocks below unity. Finally, it is noticeable the wide confidence intervals
for the cumulative multiplier effects at later time periods.
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Figure 6: Output Multiplier for Different Public Expenditures
Notes: Transformation of output response from baseline VARs. Sample for social security bene-
fits 1951:I-2007:IV. Sample for government spending 1969:I-2007:IV. Solid lines report multiplier
effect. Broken lines report 95 percent confidence interval.
Romer and Romer (2010) construct a narrative variable of legislated tax changes
At this point it is imperative to compare these estimates with other measures of
fiscal output multipliers in the existing literature. Ramey (2011) also estimates the
aggregate effect of government spending shocks for the narrative variable based on
professional forecasts of defense spending and finds a multiplier of 0.8 when using
the peak responses. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find an impact spending multiplier
of 0.8, and peak response of 1.3 after fifteen quarters. Nevertheless, the output
multiplier for government spending is in its usual range, which according to Ramey
(2011a) literature survey ranges between 0.6 and 1.8. It is also important to compare
the estimates for the transfers multiplier with estimated tax multipliers (although
these measures do not afford a one-to-one comparison). In the SVAR tradition and
for total tax revenues, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find a peak multiplier of 0.8.
Using sign restrictions in the SVAR framework, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) also
estimate the effect of aggregate taxes and find an impact multiplier of 0.3, which
rises to 0.9 after one year and reaches a maximum value of 3.4 after twelve quarters.
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and estimate that a tax hike of 1 percent of GDP has a small and not statistically
significant effect on output upon impact, but maximum effect of 3.1 percent after ten
quarters. Mertens and Ravn (2013) estimate the proxy SVAR for personal income
taxes and find a multiplier of 2.0 on impact, rising to a maximum of 2.5 in the third
quarter.
An explanation for the different effect of government spending and transfers
shocks could be their different transmission mechanism. On one hand, government
spending contributes directly to aggregate demand producing and providing ser-
vices to the public. Then, the effect of increases in government spending depends
critically on to what extend government spending replaces private spending. An
increase in government spending triggers a positive response of non-durables and
services consumption between the fourth and eight quarters. However, increases in
government spending also seem to compete directly with private investment. An
increase in government spending triggers a negative response of nonresidential in-
vestment from the fourth quarter. Altogether, the initial change in aggregate demand
does not sufficiently enhance private spending to generate a multiplier effect larger
than one.
On the other hand, government income transfers indirectly affect aggregate de-
mand through redistributing income across individuals, and influencing their spend-
ing decisions. I find that increases in transfers yield a positive effect on private
consumption and investment, specially on durable goods purchases. Altogether, the
estimates indicate that transfers generate a multiplier effect greater than one redis-
tributing income towards those individuals with a stronger response to changes in
income. This is consistent with household level evidence that benefits recipients
are likely to have higher marginal propensities to consume than other individuals
due to liquidity constraints or other idiosyncratic characteristics such as different
consumption patterns. For example, in a pioneering quasi-experimental approach,
Bodkin (1959) looks at the consumption response of WW-II veterans after the re-
ceipt of unexpected dividend payments from the National Service Life Insurance in
1950. He finds the marginal propensity to consume nondurables to be as high as
0.72. Hausman (2016) also looks at the consumption response of veterans, but of
WW-I, in a natural experiment setting. He finds that within six months of receiv-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1628
ing a large bonus in June 1936, veterans spent between 0.65 and 0.75 cents out of
every dollar received, and that they spent a large fraction of their bonus on cars,
i.e. durable goods. Parker et al. (2013) exploit the randomization in the assig-
nation of Social Security numbers to estimate the change in household spending
following the tax rebates of 2008 in the U.S. They find that on average households
spent about 50 to 90 percent of their stimulus payments on durable goods (mainly
cars), and about 12 to 30 percent on non-durables consumption goods and services
in the quarter of the tax rebate. The estimated spending responses are largest for
low-income, old age and borrowing constrained households.11 Moreover, Budrı´a-
Rodrı´guez et al (2002) and Dı´az-Gime´nez et al (1997) report interesting facts of the
income and wealth distribution in the U.S. Along employment status, nonworkers
(excluding retirees) tend to be poor in terms of income and wealth, and transfer
payments constitute a substantial source of their income. In average, retirees tend
to be income-poor but wealth-rich. However, data also points to substantial wealth
inequality within this group. Using the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest
dataset, De Nardi et al (2010) find that the elderly in the lowest quintiles of a dis-
tribution by social security benefits hold very few assets. Also, the benefits-poor
elderly run down their assets much faster than the benefits-rich (See Figure 1 in
their paper). Finally, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and Scholz, Seshadri,
and Khitatrakun (2006) argue that social insurance programs induce low-income
individuals not to save.
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence on the dynamic aggregate effects of public ex-
penditure shocks discriminating between government spending, and government
income transfers in the U.S. for the post-WWII sample. I take on the identification
challenge by adopting the identification strategy of Mertens and Ravn (2013).
11Johnson et al. (2006) study the effects of the 2001 tax rebates with similar findings.
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The results demonstrate the different macroeconomic impact that different pub-
lic expenditures shocks have. Increases in transfers affect aggregate demand through
changing individuals’ disposable income and their spending decisions. The posi-
tive response of private spending, especially durable goods purchases, results in a
transfers multiplier with values well above unity. In contrast, consistent with theory
of the crowding-out effect, increases in government spending do not sufficiently
enhance private spending to generate a multiplier effect larger than one.
This study was useful in better understanding the macroeconomic effect of shocks
to different components of public expenditures. The results have also important pol-
icy implications. An estimate for the transfers multiplier well above one compared
to an estimate of the spending multiplier between 0 and 1 indicates that for expendi-
ture policies to have an effect on the business cycle, this policies should be directed
to changes in transfers. In turn, the results side with the documented importance of
transfers in total public expenditures and support recent fiscal efforts like the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. To draw stronger conclusions though,
future research should explore alternative sources of exogenous variation. For ex-
ample, recent literature has begun analyzing cross-section variation to identify the
macroeconomic effects of government spending and interregional transfers. There
is room to explore where government income transfers to persons are involved.
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A1 Data Appendix
The following table describes the data definitions and sources. Most of the data is
retrieved form the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ NIPA Tables, last downloaded on
23rd June 2014. Another useful source has been the database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Nominal variables are converted into real terms using the GDP
deflator (NIPA Table 1.1.9 line 1) and transformed in per-capita terms dividing by
total population (Ramey (2011). All variables to the exception of rates are logged.
Series Source Definition
Output BEA Real GDP (NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 1) divided by popula-
tion.
Government spend-
ing
BEA Real federal government consumption expenditures and
gross investment (NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 23) divided by
population.
Government income
transfers
BEA Social security benefits to persons (NIPA Table 2.1 line
18) divided by the GDP deflator and population.
Personal Income Tax
Base
BEA Personal income (NIPA Table 2.1 line 1) less govern-
ment transfers (NIPA Table 2.1 line 17) plus contribu-
tions for government social insurance (NIPA Table 3.2
line 11) deflated by the GDP deflator and divided by
population.
Federal Funds rate Romer and
Romer (2010)
They extend back the series to 1950:I.
AMITR Ramey(2011) Barro-Redlick average marginal income tax rate. Sum
of the Average Marginal Individual Income Tax Rate
(AMIITR) and Average Marginal Payroll Tax Rate
(AMPTR).
Total Tax Revenues BEA Sum of current tax receipts (NIPA Table 3.2 line 2) and
contributions for government social insurance deflated
by the GDP deflator and divided by population.
CPI FRED Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and cler-
ical workers. Series CWSR0000SA0
Consumption (non-
durables and ser-
vices)
BEA Sum of real personal consumption expenditures of non-
durable goods (NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 5) and services
(NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 6) divided by population.
Durable goods pur-
chases
BEA Real personal consumption expenditures on durable
goods (NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 4) divided by population.
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Non-residential fixed
investment
BEA Real gross private domestic non-residential investment
(NIPA 1.1.3 line 9) divided by population.
Residential fixed in-
vestment
BEA Real gross private domestic residential investment
(NIPA 1.1.3 line 13) divided by population.
Employment Francis and
Ramey (2009)
Total economy employment divided by population.
Labor force FRED Sum of Employment and number of unemployment (se-
ries UNEMPLOY) divided by population.
Hours per worker Francis and
Ramey (2009)
Total economy hours worked divided by employment.
Real wages business Ramey (2011) Consistent series back to 1947.
Productivity FRED Real output per our of all persons in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector. Series OPHNFB.
Unemployment rate FRED From the Current Population Survey, civilian unem-
ployment rate (series UNRATE).
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A2 Extension narrative variable for transfers shocks
Table A2 reports the extension of the Romer and Romer (2016) narrative variable
of social security benefits increases from 1992:I to 2007:IV. The cost-of-living ad-
justments are retrieved directly form the Social Security website (https://www.ssa.
gov/oact/cola/ colaseries.html) and expressed in percentage. The benefits increases
are expressed as percentage of last quarter total taxable personal income.
Table A2: Extension Series Legislated Increases in Social Security Benefits.
Date COLAs Benefits change
Jan-92 3.7 0.20
Jan-93 3.0 0.16
Jan-94 2.6 0.15
Jan-95 2.8 0.15
Jan-96 2.6 0.14
Jan-97 2.9 0.16
Jan-98 2.1 0.11
Jan-99 1.3 0.07
Jan-00 2.5 0.12
Jan-01 3.5 0.17
Jan-02 2.6 0.13
Jan-03 1.4 0.07
Jan-04 2.1 0.11
Jan-05 2.7 0.14
Jan-06 4.1 0.21
Jan-07 3.3 0.17
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A3 Government income transfers
Figure A1 shows the evolution over the sample period of the shares of different
components of government income transfers. The long run share of Social Security
benefits is 40.81%. Data retrieved from Table 2.1 in the NIPA. Social security ben-
efits include old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits that are distributed
from the federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund and the disability in-
surance trust fund. Figure A2 shows that within social security benefits, old-age
benefits stand as the most important category. Data from the Social Security Ad-
ministration.
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Figure A1: Shares of Social Benefits, U.S. 1951:I-2007:IV
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Figure A2: Annual Benefits Paid from the OASI and DI Trust Fund, U.S. 1951:I-
2007:IV
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A4 Alternative price indices
Figure A3 shows the inflation response for alternative price indices: the CPI for
urban wage earners and clerical workers, the personal consumption expenditures
implicit deflator (PICE), and the implicit GDP deflator. The CPI and the PICE
yield very similar inflation responses. The GDP deflator implies a similar inflation
response to a shock to social security benefits, but inflation initially drops in re-
sponse to a government spending shock. The estimated output responses are not
significantly affected by the choice of a particular price index.
Figure A3: Inflation and Output Responses for Alternative Price Indices
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